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This paper discusses the pattern, causes and consequence of the high crime rates observed 
in Latin America. Crime represents a substantial welfare loss and a potentially serious 
hindrance to growth. We conduct an informal assessment of the relative strength of the 
alternative hypotheses raised in the literature to explain the phenomenon. We argue that, 
despite being extremely high, the incidence of crime in the region is not much different 
from what should be expected based on socioeconomic and public policy characteristics 
of its countries. Estimates from the empirical literature suggest that most of its seemingly 
excessively high violence can be explained by three factors: high inequality, low 
incarceration rates, and small police forces. Still, country specific experiences have been 
different in many respects. The evidence suggests that effective policies toward violence 
reduction do exist and have been shown to work within the context of Latin America 
itself. 
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1. Introduction 
  Latin America has been traditionally seen as a particularly violent region of the 
world. This perception is not new, even though it may have been enhanced over the last 
decades with the escalation of violence in countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and 
Venezuela (see Aguirre, 2000). Still, despite the fact that several candidate explanations 
have been put forth, there is no consensus regarding the reasons behind this phenomenon. 
  Table 1 presents mortality rates due to violence
1 and statistics related to various 
dimensions of development for regions of the world (comprising 73 countries for which 
mortality by cause of death is available from the World Health Organization – WHO). 
The occurrence of deaths due to violence is much more common in Latin America than in 
any other region: it is roughly 200% higher than in North America and in the Western 
Pacific, 450% higher than in Western Europe, and 30% higher than in the Former 
Communist block. The region is also significantly poorer and less educated than the 
developed countries, but statistical analyses have failed to establish an unequivocal and 
quantitatively significant link between these variables and crime. In addition, Latin 
America enjoys higher levels of income and life expectancy than most of the Former 
Communist block, but still displays substantially higher violence levels. 
  Crime and violence have many potential welfare implications. The loss in life 
expectancy at birth due to violence in violent societies can be higher than 1 year and 
sometimes even above 2 (as in Colombia in the 1990s). Recent estimates have shown that 
increases in mortality represent a quantitatively significant welfare loss, be it directly 
from the reduced welfare due to a shorter life span, or from the indirect effects of a 
shorter planning horizon on investments in physical and human capital (see Murphy and 
Topel, 2004, and Lorentzen et al, 2008, for example). In addition, material costs, 
including both direct costs and expenditures on criminal justice and crime prevention, add 
up to a significant fraction of overall production across different regions of the world (see 
Bourguignon, 1999). Finally, loss of human capital and productivity of those deceased, 
                                                 
1 Mortality due to violence is defined as the number of deaths caused by homicides and injuries purposely 
inflicted by other persons, plus other violent deaths, according to the International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD). Later on, we restrict our analysis to the category that is most closely related to common 
crimes, the homicide rate.   2
incapacitated and incarcerated add yet another layer to the social inefficiencies generated 
by crime. 
  The economic relevance of this phenomenon has been widely recognized in recent 
years, both in the research community and in the public debate. Today, the causes and 
consequences of crime are common themes in economic research. They are also among 
the main topics in the popular media in Latin America, and often bring the region to the 
headlines in the major media outlets worldwide (see, for example, the Economist, 2006 
and The Washington Post, 2007). In reality, crime and violence have been identified as 
the second most important public policy issue in the region, ranking first for countries 
such as Argentina, El Salvador, and Venezuela (Latinobarómetro 2006). 
  There are many possible explanations for the differences in violence observed 
across regions of the world and the particularly high levels observed in Latin America. 
These range from distinct definitions of crimes and different reporting rates (percentage 
of the total number of crimes actually reported to the police), to real differences in the 
incidence of crime due to inequality, degree of repression, effectiveness of the 
government, and age composition of the population. The goal of this paper is to discuss 
the pattern, causes and consequence of the high crime rates observed in Latin America. 
We argue that crime in the region represents a significant welfare loss and a potentially 
serious hindrance to growth. We then conduct a preliminary assessment of the relative 
strength of the alternative hypotheses raised in the literature. 
  In pursuing this goal, we take the rational choice perspective typical from the 
economic theory of crime. In this setup, criminals respond to economic incentives in the 
same way that legal workers do (Becker, 1968 and Stigler, 1970). In Stigler’s words, 
“[the criminal] seeks income, and for him the usual rules of occupational choice will 
hold” (Stigler, 1970, p.530). Particularly important from our point of view is the fact that 
the relative attractiveness of criminal activities is intimately related to variables that 
undergo significant changes during the process of economic development, such as 
income distribution, institutional development, government effectiveness, and 
demographic composition of the population. We ask how the economic and social 
landscape of a society affects the incentives of its citizens to engage in criminal behavior, 
and confront it with the actions that the government takes to reduce the incidence of   3
crime and violence. From this interaction of forces – the supply of potential criminals 
faced with the repressive measures imposed by the State – an equilibrium level of crime 
and violence emerges. We therefore concentrate our discussion on the dimension of crime 
that is economically motivated and is subject to a cost benefit analysis on the part of the 
perpetrator.
2 
  Our analysis shows that, despite being extremely high, the incidence of crime in 
Latin America is not much different from what should be expected based on 
socioeconomic and public policy characteristics of its countries.
3 Estimates from the 
empirical literature suggest that most of its seemingly excessively high violence can be 
explained by three factors: high inequality, low incarceration rates, and small police 
forces. In addition, country specific experiences in the recent past have been 
heterogeneous in many respects. There are examples of countries that maintained 
reasonably low violence levels throughout the last decades and also of countries that, 
starting with very high violence, were able to achieve levels comparable to that of some 
developed countries. Still, some other countries went through the last 30 years 
experiencing increasingly high and seemingly uncontrollable crime rates. As a whole, the 
evidence suggests that it is possible to have an effective policy towards violence 
reduction, and that this goal has indeed been attained by certain local governments in the 
region. 
  The position of some Latin American countries as major producers of drugs or as 
routes for the international drug traffic has important implications for organized crime 
and sometimes also for the institutional stability of its states (see, for example, Keefer et 
al, 2009). Here, we deliberately leave this dimension out of the discussion and try not to 
look at Latin America as being particular. Instead, we look at the more ordinary factors 
and policies thought to be related to the incidence of crime and ask what they can tell us. 
                                                 
2 Random acts of violence or violence among family members, which sometimes are regarded as the result 
of loss of control over one’s self, are outside the scope of our analysis. Though these represent a significant 
fraction of the violent acts registered in different regions of the world, we do not believe that they are 
responsible for most of the differences observed across regions or countries. 
3 The position of Latin America as a major producer of drugs and route of the international drug traffic has 
important implications for organized crime and sometimes also for the institutional stability of its states. 
Here, we concentrate on common crimes and do not deal with this issue explicitly. Our analysis suggests 
that one can understand most of the incidence of common crimes in the region without resorting to the role 
of drugs.    4
  There are numerous experiences of high and low, increasing and decreasing crime 
rates not accompanied by systematic differences in drug activity. Similarly, there are 
various other consuming and producing centers around the world that do not display 
remotely similar crime rates. In Latin America itself, there are today various successful 
experiences of local crime control that did not confront directly the broader issue of drug 
production and trafficking. Though drugs may be very important fuels for violence and 
institutional instability in particular countries (such as Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s) 
and particular regions of certain countries, we do not believe that they are a major factor 
determining the high levels of violence observed in Latin America, or explaining the bulk 
of the distribution of crime in the region. Our analysis suggests that one can go a very 
long way toward understanding the incidence of common crime and violence in Latin 
America without resorting to the role of drugs. 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
welfare implications of crime and violence. Section 3 summarizes the main issues in the 
measurement and comparison of crime rates across countries. Section 4 presents the 
pattern of crime in Latin America, both across countries and through time. Section 5 
analyzes some candidate explanations for the levels of violence observed in the region. 
Section 6 conducts a preliminary assessment of the relative importance of these candidate 
explanations based on estimates available from the empirical literature. Section 7 
discusses the strategy and institutional context of some successful experiences of violence 
reduction in Latin America. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Welfare Implications 
Crime and violence are a burden to society in several dimensions. There are 
straightforward consequences to the quality of life, such as reduction in lifespan, 
widespread feeling of insecurity, and change in behavior through reduced time on the 
streets. There is also the social waste from the value of goods lost and destroyed, the 
public and private expenditures on prevention, and the costs related to criminal justice 
and prison systems. In addition, and far less straightforward, crime has important non-
monetary welfare consequences, possibly reducing productivity and shortening planning   5
horizons on investments in physical and human capital. It is therefore deleterious to 
welfare in different ways, and possibly an actual hindrance to development. 
From this perspective, the Latin American situation is particularly worrisome. The 
region fell behind in terms of growth in the last 20 years and is remarkably violent by 
international standards. According to the International Crime Victimization Survey 
(ICVS), about 44 percent of Latin Americans are victims of some type of crime every 
year (average for the 1990s). During the last decade, the region had systematically the 
highest rate of deaths due to violence in the world: 21.8 per 100,000 inhabitants. This 
position has given Latin America headlines in major international media outlets and has 
made it infamous throughout the world. A recent example is a report stating that 729 
Israeli and Palestinian minors were killed as a result of violence between 2002 and 2006, 
while 1,857 minors were reported murdered in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, during the same 
period (The Washington Post, 2007).  
Measuring the magnitude of the negative consequences of crime, however, is a 
difficult task. There are multiple dimensions that one should take into account, and there 
is no unified framework in the literature to tackle the problem. The material costs of 
crime and violence, including both direct costs and expenditures on criminal justice and 
crime prevention, have been estimated to add up to a significant fraction of production 
across different regions of the world. This number is thought to be around 2.1% of the 
GDP per year for the United States, and 3.6% for Latin America (see, for example, 
Bourguignon, 1999 and Londono and Guerrero, 1999). Considering monetary costs 
related to property crime, the number rises to 2.6% for the US and 5.1% for Latin 
America (see Bourguignon, 1999). There is however debate in the literature on whether 
this is actually a social cost, rather than a transfer of resources between members of 
society. Glaeser (1999) argues that, since generally the goods are valued less by the 
criminals than by the people who lose them, it should indeed be considered a social loss. 
The value should equal, in equilibrium, the opportunity cost of criminal’s time, i.e., the 
time spent on crime instead of legal activities, and this does correspond to a welfare loss. 
On top of material costs, one of the most important direct consequences of crime 
is the increase in injury and mortality rates. Economists have recently developed tools 
that allow the estimation of the social cost from reductions in life expectancy and have   6
shown that these can be quantitatively very important. In the case of violence, this has 
been shown to represent a substantial welfare loss, of the same order of magnitude of 
direct material costs of crime. Based on a willingness to pay approach, Soares (2006) 
estimates that 1 year of life expectancy lost to violence is associated on average with a 
yearly social cost of 3.8% of the GDP. This estimate still leaves out the costs due to 
injury and reduced health, for which there are no trustworthy economic based estimates 
available.  
The non-monetary dimension reinforces the severity of the Latin American 
scenario. In the 1990s, individuals born in Latin America had life expectancies on 
average 0.6 year lower because of violence (see Table 1). This number was at least two 
times higher than the loss in life expectancy for any other region, but for the Former 
Communist countries. It reached its peak in Colombia, where 2.2 expected years of life 
were lost because of violence. To put these numbers in perspective, reductions in life 
expectancy due to violence represented social losses analogous to a permanent decline of 
9.7% of yearly income for Colombia, as compared to only 0.9% for the United States 
(Soares, 2006). 
Figure 1 shows the discounted present social value of violence reduction as a 
share of GDP for several countries, as estimated by Soares (2006), ordered from highest 
to lowest. From the nine frontrunners, eight are Latin American: Colombia, with an 
astounding 281%, followed by the Philippines (280%), Venezuela (95%), Chile (86%), El 
Salvador (73%), Belize (71%), Suriname (67%), Mexico (67%), and Brazil (65%). The 
11 remaining countries that complete the top-twenty in Figure 1 are all Latin American 
and Caribbean or Former Communist. In the other extreme of the distribution, the 10 
lowest values are all Western European countries, plus Japan. 
Mortality due to violence in high-violence areas is a particularly perverse 
phenomenon due to its concentration at prime ages. Figures 2 (a) and (b) show the age 
profile of mortality by violence for selected countries. In addition to illustrating the extent 
of difference between the various countries, the figure also highlights that violent 
countries such as Brazil, Colombia and Russia have the vast majority of mortality due to 
violence concentrated between ages 15 and 40.   7
The non-monetary dimension of the costs of crime, together with its specific age 
profile, induces also indirect economic consequences. These are effects from changes in 
behavior induced by reductions in the length of productive life, such as decreased 
investments in human capital and health, reduced savings and investments in physical 
capital, and, therefore, reduced long-run growth. 
Shorter life horizons reduce the incentives for individuals to take actions that 
generate long-term benefits and short term costs, such as investing in education and 
saving for the future.
4 One of the main channels linking mortality to growth is fertility 
(Lorentzen et al, 2008). There is a positive relationship between mortality and fertility, 
and a negative relationship between these two variables and investments in human 
capital. In countries with a high HIV prevalence, for example, parents have on average 
two more children when compared with countries with low HIV prevalence (Kalemli-
Ozcan, 2006). This connection leads to a negative correlation between adult mortality and 
investment in human and physical capital, and it can be a source of poverty traps.  
Finally, there are intangible costs in the labor market and negative effects to 
business climate. According to Londono and Guerrero (1999), intangible costs of crime – 
deterioration of productivity, consumption, and labor force – constitute the major part of 
Latin American’s estimated cost of violence, corresponding to 7.1% of the region’s GDP. 
Nevertheless, these dimensions are conceptually less clear and difficult to estimate in a 
convincing way. Still, it is important to highlight the impact of crime on institutional 
stability and business environment, particularly where there is a significant presence of 
organized crime. Gaviria and Velez (2002) argue that crime has a perverse effect on 
economic efficiency, reducing investment and employment in poor urban Colombian 
communities. In Brazil, 52% of managers rank crime as a major business constraint 
according to the World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey (2003). 
  The perverse effects of crime are therefore multi-dimensional and the magnitude 
of its costs depends on what is taken into account. In any case, costs of crime and 
violence represent a significant share of aggregate production, and particularly so in Latin 
America, where crime rates have been high for most of the last decades. In order to 
                                                 
4 Even for those who do go to school, a violent environment can be harmful to human capital accumulation. 
According to Severnini (2007), conditioning on individual characteristics, students attending more violent 
schools perform significantly worse in a Brazilian national exam.   8
illustrate this point, we draw on the literature discussed before and gather in Table 2 a set 
of estimates related to various dimensions of the costs of crime and violence. These are 
the dimensions over which there is not much theoretical controversy and for which 
comparable estimates exist for the US and Latin America. 
  As can be seen, costs of violence as a proportion of GDP are substantially higher 
in Latin America when compared to the US. Most of the difference comes from costs 
related to increased mortality and public and private security expenditures. Overall, costs 
of violence in the region would be even higher, around 13% of GDP, if the intangible 
dimensions suggested by Londono and Guerrero (1999) were included in the calculations. 
  Regardless, it seems indisputable that violence and crime represent a very serious 
public policy issue in the region. The remainder of this paper tries to understand the 
reasons behind this state of affairs. We start by addressing the issue of comparison of 
crime rates across countries, and then describe the pattern and evolution of violence in the 
recent past. Following, we ask what factors could lie behind the observed pattern and 
investigate whether there seems to be effective policies to fight crime available for the 
governments in the region. 
 
3. The Measurement of Crime 
  Any international comparison of crime has to deal inevitably with the issue of 
measurement error in crime rates. This problem can be illustrated by the pattern of results 
usual in the first generations of papers on the topic. Early empirical studies on the 
determinants of cross-regional differences in crime rates were mainly concentrated on the 
analysis of the effects of inequality and development on crime. Detailed reviews of the 
criminology literature are presented in Patterson (1991) and Fowles and Merva (1996). 
The statistical approaches used in the different studies and their respective conclusions 
were as diverse as they could possibly be. The major part of the evidence regarded within 
US studies, with the units changing from neighborhoods and cities to counties and 
metropolitan areas. Results on inequality in this case varied between positive and non-
significant from crime to crime and from study to study, leaving no clearly identifiable 
pattern. In relation to development, US studies most often indicated a negative effect of 
income level (or positive effect of poverty level) on crime rates, although non-significant   9
and even positive results were sometimes present. The international evidence, 
surprisingly, suggested a conclusion strikingly different from this one. While the few 
inequality studies left no clear answer, the evidence on development seemed to be 
overwhelming: virtually all the international evidence from the criminology literature 
suggested that development and crime rates were positively and significantly correlated.  
  The empirical literature from economics has challenged this consensus and raised 
concerns regarding the problem of underreporting in official crime statistics (see 
Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza, 2002a and 2002b and Soares, 2004a and 2004b). 
Previously, this result was regarded almost as a stylized fact by criminologists and 
sociologists used to the international comparisons of crime rates. Burnham (1990, p.44), 
for example, claims that “evidence as exists seems to suggest that development is indeed 
probably criminogenic.” Along the same lines, Stack’s (1984, p.236) empirical 
specification includes “level of economic development, a factor found to be related 
positively to property crime rates in the previous cross-national research.” 
  But recent evidence has shown that these results have an explanation far more 
simple than the industrialization induced social disintegration usually suggested in the 
sociological literature. One major statistical problem is systematically overlooked in most 
cross-national studies: the non-randomness of the reporting error (see, for example, 
Krohn and Wellford, 1977, Krohn, 1978, and Stack, 1984). Official data is known to 
greatly underestimate actual crime rates, and this can constitute a serious problem if the 
degree of underestimation is correlated with the characteristics of the country. 
  The rate of crime reporting is the fraction of the total number of crimes that is 
actually reported to the police. We draw on Soares (2004a) and construct this variable by 
crossing data from official crime records (United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and 
Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, UNCS) with data from victimization surveys 
(International Crime Victim Survey, ICVS). 
The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) is a survey conducted by a group 
of international research institutes under the coordination of the United Nations 
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). It contains data for selected 
countries, irregularly distributed over the years 1989, 1992 and/or 1996/7. Since it is an 
independent standardized victimization survey, the ICVS should be free from the   10
systematic bias introduced by the problem of underreporting and, therefore, should give 
an unbiased estimate of the “true” crime rate and of its variation across countries. The 
other dataset used is the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of 
Criminal Justice Systems (UNCS), which is a dataset created by the United Nations with 
information related to several crime and justice related variables, based on official 
records. Several countries and years are irregularly covered in the period between 1971 
and 1994.  
We concentrate on the three types of crimes that can be compared across the 
victimization survey (ICVS) and the official records survey (UNCS): thefts, burglaries, 
and contact crimes (robberies, sexual incidents and threats/assaults). See the discussion in 
Soares (2004b) for a detailed account of the comparability of the two datasets. 
  Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for crime rates obtained from victimization 
surveys and from official records (sample composed by 45 countries). The numbers are 
extremely different. Comparing the cross-country averages from the ICVS with the ones 
from the UNCS, we have the following numbers: according to the official records, 2.1% 
for thefts, 0.7% for burglaries and 0.3% for contact crimes; according to the victim 
survey, 25.1% for thefts, 6.7% for burglaries and 7.7% for contact crimes. Implicitly, this 
means that the fraction of the total number of crimes reported to the police varies widely 
across countries and across different types of crime. In reality, this statistic ranges from 
virtually zero (as for thefts in Egypt or India) to virtually one (as for burglaries in Austria 
and Finland). Soares (2004a) shows that this variation is strongly related to income per 
capita. Figure 3 reproduces this result and illustrates the strong positive correlation 
between reporting rates of, respectively, thefts, burglaries, and contact crimes and 
income. Income per capita alone explains 65% of the cross-country variation in reporting 
rates for thefts, 54% for burglaries, and 45% for contact crimes. Soares (2004a) also 
shows that this correlation is responsible for the criminologists’ erroneous conclusion that 
development and crime rates are positively related. 
  This result suggests that the positive link between crime and development, usually 
cited in the criminology literature but regarded with suspicion by economists, does not 
exist. More generally, it suggests that care must be exercised when comparing official 
crime rates across countries, since reporting depends on various characteristics that may   11
also be related to the incidence of crime itself. In particular, Soares (2004b) shows that 
crime reporting is strongly related to institutional stability, police presence, and perceived 
corruption. 
Table 4 presents pair-wise correlations between various variables
5 measured as 
averages for the 1990s and the three reporting rates discussed before. Reporting rates for 
different crimes are strongly correlated with each other (correlation coefficient significant 
and above 0.6 in all cases). Time of democratic stability, degree of urbanization, and 
average schooling are also positively and significantly related to the rate of crime 
reporting for the three types of crimes. Number of policemen per capita is positively 
correlated with reporting rates, but coefficients are not significant. Finally, corruption has 
an extremely high negative and significant correlation with the reporting rates of all types 
of crime. 
Since most of these variables are correlated with overall development, it is 
difficult to tell precisely what this pattern of correlations reveals. In a multivariate setting, 
Soares (2004b) shows that the most robust correlation is that between reporting rates and 
measures of institutional development. We reproduce his basic result in Table 5. The 
table shows that, in a multivariate setting, the reporting rates of crime tend to be strongly 
related to institutional development – be it measured as time of democratic stability or as 
incidence of corruption – and also to police presence. Therefore, comparisons of crime 
rates across regions, or within a region through time, should bear in mind that differences 
or changes in the level of institutional development may compromise the meaningful use 
of official crime statistics. 
Still, as of today, victimization data are very irregularly distributed over countries 
and years, and have limited coverage in terms of the developing world. So, for practical 
purposes, they cannot be used to give an encompassing picture of the state and evolution 
of crime rates across different areas of the globe. The alternative is to use the crime data 
less likely to be contaminated by the reporting bias, namely, homicide rates obtained 
from sources based on death certificates. It is likely that the elasticity of the reporting rate 
                                                 
5 Number of policemen per 100,000 inhabitants from the UNCS; time of democratic stability from Beck et 
al. (2001); percentage of the population living in urban areas from the World Development Indicators; 
average years of schooling in population aged 15 and above from the Barro and Lee dataset; and indicator 
constructed from the financial risk associated with corruption, as estimated by the International Country 
Risk Guide.   12
in relation to development is much smaller for homicides than for other types of crime. In 
addition, death certificates have always to be filed. Therefore, in this case, reporting does 
not depend directly on the willingness of citizens, and the record keeping has automatic 
mechanisms that work outside of the police and judicial structures. 
For the reasons outlined above, we concentrate most of our analysis of the causes 
and consequences of crime in Latin America on the number of homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants. In the next section, we lay out a broad picture of the pattern and recent 
evolution of crime in Latin America, using both the scant data available from 
victimization surveys and time series of homicide rates.  
 
4. Crime Patterns in Latin America 
  Table 1 showed that, by international standards, Latin America has an 
exceptionally high number of deaths due to violence. Tables 6 and 7 show that high crime 
in the region is not restricted to homicides and other types of violence that culminate in 
death. The tables present numbers from victimization surveys (ICVS) for world regions 
and individual countries, respectively. Excluding Africa, burglary rates are at least 40% 
higher in Latin America than in any other region of the world, while theft rates are at 
least 30% higher and contact crimes rates are at least 70% higher. When compared to 
Africa, Latin America has lower burglary rates by 1 percentage point, virtually identical 
theft rates, and contact crimes rates 3.6 percentage points higher, while overall crime 
rates are 4 percentage points higher. High crime rates in Latin America span different 
types of crime and clearly dominate the levels observed in any other region. 
  Still, there are marked differences in country specific experiences within Latin 
America itself. In the victimization dataset, a very narrow set of countries is available 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Paraguay), but still victimization 
rates ranges from 4.6% to 14.4% for burglary, 11.8% to 20.2% for thefts, and 11% to 
21% for contact crimes. Costa Rica, for example, has relatively low crime and low 
mortality due to violence, while Colombia has high marks in both statistics. 
 Heterogeneity  across  countries also manifests itself in the dynamics of crime rates 
through time. In order to take a closer look at the evolution of crime rates over the last 
few decades, we concentrate on homicide rates, the only trustworthy statistic available for   13
a longer time span. We choose a restricted group composed of some of the main countries 
in the region. This group will also guide our analysis in the later discussion about the 
candidate explanations for the high crime rates observed in Latin America. The selected 
countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Venezuela. 
The choice of these specific countries makes our discussion a little more focused and 
concrete, and allows the investigation of certain types of phenomenon for which data are 
not immediately and widely available. 
  Figures 4 (a) and (b) plot the homicide rates for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela for the period between 1979 and 2006. 
Homicide data are from cause of death statistics from mortality records (either from the 
World Health Organization, from the Pan American Health Organization, or from 
national health authorities). Figure 4 (a) presents the data for countries within this group 
that display exceptionally high crime rates during the period, while Figure 4 (b) presents 
the data for those with lower rates. 
  The first group includes Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela, with homicide rates 
ranging from 20 to above 60 per 100,000 by the beginning of the 2000s. Among these, 
the Colombian case is the most striking, with an already high rate rising from 30 in the 
early 1980s to 82 in the early 1990s, and then falling to reach a still very high level by the 
end of the 1990s. Starting in 2002, Colombia then experiences successive reductions in 
homicide rates, which persist until today, reaching 40 per 100,000 in 2006. 
  The sheer scale of the magnitude and of the changes observed in Colombia 
dwarves the experiences of other countries, but also in these cases changes have been 
substantial. In the case of Brazil, the homicide rate rises almost monotonically in the 
period, increasing by more than 200% of its initial value by 2003. In that year, the rate 
peaks at 29 per 100,000 inhabitants and starts a timid declining trend leading to a level of 
26.8 in 2006. Venezuela starts the period at levels similar to those of Brazil, and 
experiences more or less stable homicide rates until the mid 1990s, when it also starts 
registering major increases, surpassing Brazil by the early 2000s. Venezuela almost 
triples its homicide rate in the short period of time between 1998 and 2006. 
  Figure 4 (b) presents the experiences of Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and 
Mexico, all of which display much lower homicide rates than those registered in the   14
countries from Figure 4 (a). Argentina experiences a timid but almost monotonic increase 
since 1979, with the homicide rate roughly doubling between 1979 and 2003, when it 
peaks at 7.3 and starts declining to reach 5 in 2006. Chile, on its turn, experiences 
extremely low homicide rates for the entire period, despite a discrete but stable increase 
around year 2000 (when the rates jump from a historical plateau around 3 to a new level 
above 5). Similarly, Costa Rica oscillates, but maintains low homicide through most of 
the period. In the last years of the series, a more sustained increase in crime seems to take 
place, reaching a rate of 8 per 100,000 in 2006. Though relatively high by international 
standards, homicide rates for Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica are comparable to those 
observed in most of the developed world, and are well below the average levels registered 
in Latin America. 
  Among the countries in the two figures, the Mexican experience is quite peculiar. 
Mexico starts with very high homicide rates – 18 per 100,000 – and, after almost 20 years 
of sustained reductions, reaches only 50% of the initial value by 2004.
6 This sustained 
reduction is then followed by mild increases between 2004 and 2006, from 9.1 to 10.2. 
Based on media reports, these increases seem to have taken off in the last few years, with 
the intensified presence and extreme violence of drug cartels along the US border (see, 
for example, The New York Times, 2009). The Mexican experience is both reassuring 
and worrisome. It portrays, at the same time a concrete history of long term reduction in 
violence but, at the same time, it shows that gains can always be threatened and reversed. 
  An important point raised before can be illustrated by the experiences of these 
countries. Everywhere, but particularly in violent places, homicides are 
disproportionately concentrated on the young population. Figures 5 (a) and (b) present the 
same statistic presented in Figures 4 (a) and (b), but restricted to the age group between 
15 and 24. The figures display similar patterns to the ones discussed previously, but for 
two distinguishing features. First, in the case of Figure 5 (a), the scale is almost twice that 
observed in Figure 4 (a). Second, in Figure 5 (b), the incidence of mortality by violence is 
generally higher than that observed in Figure 4 (b), but the difference is not so stark. So, 
                                                 
6 For the total number of deaths due to violence, results are much more extreme and positive for Chile and 
Mexico, with the total mortality rate due to violence falling from 40 to 7 in Chile, and from 28 to 13 in 
Mexico. For the other countries, patterns are very similar to those observed for the homicide rates, just with 
higher levels.   15
for example, by the end of the 1990s the homicide rate in the age group between 15 and 
24 was more than 74% higher than that of the general population for Brazil, Colombia, 
and Venezuela. The same number for Costa Rica was 25%. The general point about these 
figures is that violence falls disproportionately on the young, and particularly so in high 
violence societies. Figure 5 (a) also highlight that changes in violence tend to be more 
extreme when one looks at younger fractions of the population, as compared to the entire 
population distribution. The same thing is true about the male population. If we restricted 
the homicide rate to the male population between 15 and 24 years of age, we would end 
up with numbers almost two times higher than those observed in Figure 5(a). 
  This section highlighted that the high crime rates observed in Latin America span 
various different types of crime and do not seem to be an artifact of the particular 
statistics used. Nevertheless, it also showed that country specific experiences in the 
region have been different in many respects. The question remains therefore why some 
countries have been successful in maintaining low levels of violence or reducing violence 
to levels observed in the developed world, while others have seen increasing crime rates 
and seemingly uncontrollable trends. In the next sections, we explore some possible 
explanations. 
 
5. Candidate Explanations 
  In this section, we concentrate on the group of seven countries enumerated before 
and conduct an informal assessment of the merit of some hypotheses raised in the 
literature as potential explanations for the crime rates observed in Latin America. These 
hypotheses can be broadly classified into two categories: (i) those related to social and 
economic conditions conducive to an environment where criminal activities are more 
attractive to a larger fraction of the population; and (ii) those related to government 
actions targeted at repression of criminal activities. 
  The first group includes economic and demographic conditions that put a large 
fraction of the population at the margin of choosing whether or not to engage in criminal 
and violent activities. Economic conditions typically identified are related to growth and 
inequality. According to the economic theory of crime, the likelihood that individuals 
will engage in criminal activities increases with the potential gains of crime and falls with   16
its opportunity cost (see, for example, the early treatment of the topic in Ehrlich, 1973). 
The potential gains from criminal activities are related to the wealth of potential targets, 
while its opportunity costs are given by the gains from legal activities (low-skill wages in 
the labor market or returns to micro-entrepreneurship). A poor economic performance in 
the short-run reduces legal opportunities in the economy, without necessarily affecting 
significantly its stock of wealth, therefore increasing the attractiveness of criminal 
behavior. Inequality, on its turn, leads to a situation where a significant fraction of the 
population is endowed with wealth and high income, constituting therefore potential 
criminal targets, while another fraction has very low income, and therefore low 
opportunity cost of engaging in criminal activities. Sociological theories of relative 
deprivation also link economic inequality to higher crime. 
  For these reasons, economic growth and income inequality are variables thought 
to be important determinants of the incidence of crime. In general, the statistical evidence 
does support this relationship and recent studies have been able to find systematic 
correlations between these two variables and various measures of crime rates (see, for 
example, Bourguignon, Nuñez, and, Sanchez, 2003, Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza, 
2002a and 2002b, and Soares, 2004a). In particular, inequality seems to be a variable 
closely related to the incidence of crime and violence, both in theory and in the data, and 
it has been one of the main focuses of both theoretical and empirical work (see papers 
cited above and Ehrlich, 1973, for example). 
   Demographic factors are associated with the age structure of the population and 
socioeconomic conditions. A traditional literature from criminology argues that both 
perpetrators and victims of criminal and violent activities are, in the majority of cases, 
young. For example, according to the Brazilian 2007 “Map of Violence”, the increase in 
homicide rates in Brazil over the last decades is due exclusively to the increase in  the 
homicide rate among young people: it soared from 30 in the 1980s to 51.7 in 2004, while 
the rate in other age groups fell slightly, from 21.3 to 20.8 (Waiselfisz, 2007). The 
relationship between age distribution and crime is well established at the individual level 
in the empirical literature, despite the evidence that its role in explaining aggregate 
variations in US crime rates in the recent past is rather limited (Levitt, 1999). The 
particularly intense susceptibility of the young to fall into a trajectory of crime and   17
illegality is most likely related to its weak attachment to the labor market and lower risk 
aversion, and maybe also to stronger peer effects (see Grogger, 1998). In any case, 
evidence seems to suggest that this may have been an important factor in the recent 
experience of some Latin American countries (de Mello and Schneider, 2009). 
  Recently, a more sophisticated version of this argument was developed, claiming 
that not only the size of a cohort is important, but specifically the number of births of 
lower quality within a given cohort (unwanted births, births to broken homes under 
disadvantaged socioeconomic conditions, etc). This is the logic underlying the idea that 
the legalization of abortion in the US was one of the main reasons behind the reduction in 
crime rates observed in the 1990s (Donohue and Levitt, 2001). A similar argument has 
been applied to the context of developing countries, specifically to the case of Brazil, to 
suggest that the increase in crime rates starting in the end of the 20
th century was the 
result of reductions in child mortality rates in the low socioeconomic strata 20 years 
beforehand (Hartung, 2006). 
  The other relevant dimension in the determination of crime rates is related to the 
strength and effectiveness of the repressive policies adopted by the government. Policies 
to curb the incidence of crime include incarceration of offenders and harsher penalties for 
criminals, large police forces, effective judicial systems, and, overall, respect to the law 
and a clean and efficient government apparatus. Careful statistical analyses have 
confirmed beyond doubt the crime reducing role of police presence and incarceration of 
criminals (for example, Levitt, 1996, 1997, and 2002, and Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 
2004). Data availability and the nature of the statistical problem have precluded more 
detailed evaluation of some of the other dimensions. 
  In order to evaluate whether these factors seem to have some merit in explaining 
the incidence of crime in Latin America, we take a closer look at some variables that try 
to capture the various dimensions discussed above. Data on some of these issues are very 
scarce in the cross-country context, so we restrict the analysis to the seven Latin 
American countries enumerated before (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, and Venezuela) and to a set of six reference countries. These reference countries 
are chosen so as to include: two of the most developed countries in the world, the first 
with low and the second with reasonably high crime rates (Japan and US, respectively);   18
an Eastern country that had a similar level of development to that of Latin America until 
the recent past (South Korea); an European country of similar cultural background 
(Spain); and a low and a high crime countries from other cultural traditions (Sweden and 
Russia, respectively). 
  For this set of thirteen countries, we look for variables representing the different 
economic, demographic, and policy factors discussed previously. For the economic and 
demographic factors, we choose the following variables: growth rate of income per capita 
between 1980 and 2000 to represent recent economic performance; Gini index to measure 
income inequality; birth rate in 1980 to represent the size of the entering cohort 20 years 
prior to 2000; and share of the population between 15 and 29 years to capture the relative 
size of the group most likely to engage in criminal activities. In relation to the policy 
dimensions, we choose the following variables: number of policemen per capita, number 
of judges per capita, incarceration rate, and a variable indicating the level of institutional 
development and rule of law in the country (rule of law).
7 The definitions and sources of 
all the variables are presented in the notes to the table below. 
  Table 8 presents the homicide rate and the eight variables described in the last 
paragraph for the set of thirteen countries chosen for this closer inspection. The average 
homicide rate for the selected Latin American countries, which equals 21.5, is much 
higher than that observed in any country in the comparison group but Russia. Japan, 
Korea, Spain, and Sweden have all extremely low homicide rates (all below 2), while the 
US has a rate (5.9) comparable to the lowest Latin American numbers.  
  A clear pattern immediately emerges from this table. First, in relation to the 
economic variables, the selected Latin American countries display particularly poor 
economic performances and exceptionally high inequality levels. The average growth rate 
of income per capita between 1980 and 2000 for the countries in the region is only 0.7%, 
less than half that of the lowest growth rate observed in the comparison group, apart from 
that of Russia. Russia faced the collapse of communism during this time interval, so its 
performance does not seem to constitute a particularly appealing comparison in what 
                                                 
7 The rule of law index is defined as the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. The index is a standardized measure with range between -2.5 (weakest 
institutions) and 2.5 (strongest institutions). For more detailed description, see Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2006).   19
refers to economic growth. In relation to inequality, the lowest level observed among the 
selected Latin American countries (45.8 for Venezuela) is higher than the highest level 
observed in the comparison group (42.5 for Russia). On average, the Gini index is almost 
20 points (54%) higher in the region than in the comparison group. 
  The demographic variables also work in the same direction, though maybe not 
with such extreme differences. Birth rates in the region in 1980, as well as the share of 
the population between ages 15 and 29 in 2000, indicate the presence of a large fraction 
of the population in age groups particularly prone to criminal involvement and 
victimization. The birth rate in 1980 for the Latin American countries included in the 
table was 24.9, in contrast to 20.9 in the comparison group, while the shares of the young 
population in 2000 were, respectively, 27% and 22%. At the same time, Latin America 
experienced very fast and intense declines in child mortality rates between 1960 and 
1990, opening space for an argument in the reverse direction of that developed by 
Donohue and Levitt (2001), as suggested by Hartung (2006). In this sense, the frequency 
of individuals from extreme socioeconomic conditions and fragile household 
environments is likely to have increased in the distribution of adolescents and young 
adults. 
  The previous paragraphs paint a picture of a large fraction of the population in 
Latin America in age groups prone to involvement in criminal activities, at the same time 
when economic conditions – low growth and high inequality – make criminal activities 
particularly attractive. The other side of this equation is the set of repressive policies put 
in place by the government, and the effectiveness of these policies. The balance between 
these two forces determines the final incidence of crime and violence in a given society. 
  Overall, the group of Latin American countries under analysis has very timid 
repressive policies when compared to the reference group. The average number of 
policemen per 100,000 inhabitants is 252, as opposed to 398 in the comparison group, 
while the number of judges is 7.5 in comparison to 15.2, and the incarceration rate is 139 
in comparison to 282. In addition, if the index of rule of law captures the efficiency of 
government policies, it is likely that these instruments are less effective in Latin America 
than in countries in the comparison group: the average of the index, which varies between   20
-2.5 and +2.5, is -0.4 for the selected Latin American countries and +1.0 for the 
comparison group. 
  The differences are even more striking when we contrast the Latin American 
average to the most violent countries in the comparison group. These are Russia and the 
US, which react to the high violence levels by enforcing a very strict set of repressive 
policies: the number of policemen per 100,000 inhabitants is 1,222 in Russia and 325 in 
the US, while the number of judges is 47 and 11, and the incarceration rate is 638 and 
685, respectively. In comparison, Brazil Colombia, and Venezuela, the most violent 
among the selected Latin American countries, have modest levels for these three 
variables, roughly comparable to or below that of Spain, a country with extremely low 
incidence of crime. In reality, the most intense use of repressive policies in Latin America 
is observed precisely among those countries that have enjoyed reasonably controlled 
levels of violence: the highest numbers of policemen per 100,000 inhabitants are 
observed in Argentina and Mexico, while the highest number of judges is in Costa Rica, 
and the highest incarceration rate is in Chile.  
  The superficial inspection of the numbers from Table 8 seems to suggest that the 
high crime rates observed in Latin America are not that surprising after all. Economic and 
demographic factors are conducive to an environment where a large fraction of the 
population is at the margin of choosing whether or not to engage in criminal activities. 
Differences in inequality are particularly striking in this respect. The average Gini index 
among our 7 Latin American countries is almost 20 points higher than that in the 
comparison group. At the same time, policies toward the repression of crime are weak 
and likely ineffective. Most noticeable in this case is the very low number of policemen 
per 100,000 inhabitants and the incarceration rate, the latter being less than half of that 
observed in the comparison group. 
  In the remaining sections, we discuss the scope for successful policy interventions 
targeted at reducing crime in the region. First, based on the statistical estimates available 
from the literature, we ask how much one can hope to achieve with the use of the policy 
instruments available and, over the long-run, with changes in socioeconomic conditions. 
Following, we briefly analyze some specific experiences of localized interventions that 
have been successful at reducing crime and violence.   21
 
6. The Scope for Action 
  The previous section argued that several factors identified as potentially important 
seem to contribute to the high crime rates observed in Latin America. In this section, we 
draw on estimates from the empirical literature and ask how much the dimensions 
discussed before can explain, given what is known quantitatively from the evidence 
available. In doing so, we are constrained to work only with those variables that map well 
established estimates from the empirical literature. For natural reasons, these are also the 
variables that typically attract most attention. 
  In what follows, we concentrate on the effects of incarceration rates, number of 
policemen per 100,000 inhabitants, fraction of the population between 15 and 29, 
inequality, and economic growth. Regarding the other variables appearing in Table 8, 
there are no widely accepted estimates available in the literature. 
  In relation to public safety policies, theory argues that increases in prison 
population can reduce crime through either deterrence or incapacitation effects. Levitt 
(1996) estimates that violent crime in the US would be 70% higher if the number of 
prisoners had remained constant over the last decades. He argues that incarcerating one 
additional prisoner reduces the number of crimes by approximately fifteen per year, a 
number in close accordance with the level of criminal activity reported by the median 
prisoner in surveys. His estimates suggest that a 1% increase in the incarceration rate 
reduces the number of violent crimes by -0.379%. Levitt (1997 and 2002) also argues that 
increases in police are very effective in reducing violent crime, even though the effect on 
property crime may be substantially smaller. In this case, the average estimate suggests 
that a 1% increase in the number of policemen per capita is associated with a reduction of 
-0.435% in the incidence of violent crimes. 
  Estimates for the effect of demographic composition are available from Levitt 
(1999). He shows that, in the case of the US, changes in age structure explain 20% of the 
increase in murder rates observed between 1960 and 1980, and 40% of the reduction 
observed between 1980 and 1995. His counterfactual exercise implies an average 
response of homicides of 0.41% per each 1% increase in the fraction of young people in 
the population.   22
  Inequality is probably the single factor most widely studied in the cross-country 
literature on crime rates. It has been consistently identified as one of the main economic 
determinant of crime and violence, through its effects on the costs and benefits of 
criminal activities and on social cohesion (see, among others, Bourguignon, 1999, 
Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza, 2002a and 2002b, Bourguignon, Nuñez, and Sanchez, 
2003, and Soares, 2004a). A widely cited study by Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 
(2002b) shows that increases in income inequality and reductions in the level of 
economic activity are significantly related to increases in crime rates. Their statistical 
model implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the Gini index is associated with a 
1.5% increase in homicide rates, and that a 1 percentage point increase in the growth rate 
of income per capita is associated with a decline of 2.4%. 
  Though these various estimates are from different types of data and different 
sources, not necessarily applicable to the Latin American reality, we use them as 
benchmarks to guide the discussion on the potential for crime reduction in the region, 
along the dimensions discussed in the previous section. The question being addressed is 
whether, given the numbers most commonly cited in the literature, changes in factors 
typically identified as associated with crime would lead to substantial reductions in crime 
rates in Latin America. If the answer is yes it means that, at first sight, the Latin 
American case would not be exceptional and standard policies would be the obvious first 
choice to tackle the problem. On the other hand, if the answer is no, it would seem that 
still unidentified characteristics of the region would be responsible for the high crime 
rates observed, and non-orthodox policies might be called for. 
  Table 9 presents the estimates of the effects on crime of the explanatory variables 
discussed in the last paragraphs. It also presents counterfactual calculations of the average 
homicide rate that would be observed in the selected Latin American countries if the 
different explanatory variables were set to the levels observed in the comparison group. 
We present the partial impact of each explanatory variable (each one being changed 
separately), as well as the cumulative impact (various variables being change 
simultaneously, cumulative from top to bottom). 
  Maybe the most striking result from this table is the fact that, given the numbers 
observed and the estimates available from the literature, the high violence levels observed   23
in Latin America are not surprising at all. This fact was already alluded to in the previous 
section, but it becomes clearer in the simple quantitative exercise from Table 9. If the 
average incarceration rates, number of policemen per capita, fraction of young 
population, inequality, and growth in the selected Latin American countries were set to 
the averages observed in the comparison group, mortality by violence in Latin America 
would drop from 21.5 to 6.3. Since Russia is somewhat of an outlier within the 
comparison group in terms of the harshness of its repressive policies and its crime rates, 
we also present an alternative scenario where the variables in Latin America are set to the 
average of the comparison group excluding Russia. In this scenario, the homicide rate in 
Latin America would fall to 10.7. In any case, the homicide rate falls between 50% and 
66% in the counterfactual exercises, when the explanatory variables are set to the levels 
observed in the comparison group (including and excluding Russia, respectively).  
  In the first scenario, homicide rates are actually reduced to a level almost identical 
to that observed in the comparison group, while in the second scenario it still remains 
substantially above it, despite attaining quite reasonable levels (equivalent to those 
observed in the US during the 1990s, for example). In words, the violence levels 
observed in Latin America do not seem to be unusually high, given the socioeconomic 
conditions observed in the region, the repressive policies adopted by its governments, and 
what is known from the empirical literature about the relationship between these 
variables and crime. Fajnzylber et al (1998) also reached similar conclusions in an 
entirely different setting, applying dynamic panel data techniques with a cross-country 
dataset.  
  Separately, the quantitative roles of inequality, incarceration rates, and police 
seem to be the most important ones, while age composition and economic growth seem to 
have only modest effects. According to the counterfactual scenarios, changing the level 
of inequality to that observed in the comparison group would lead to a reduction of 28% 
in homicide rates, while the similar number for incarceration rates and police presence 
would be, respectively, 39% and 25%. 
  While incarceration rates and number of policemen are policy variables directly 
under the control of the government, inequality is an outcome variable that changes 
typically slowly through time (see Deininger and Squire, 1996). There are various   24
reasons why reduction in inequality is desirable for its own sake, and it should indeed be 
seen as a valid policy goal. But it is generally not an instrument subject to immediate 
control of the government, so it should not be seen as a tool within a short or medium-
term strategy for reducing crime. 
  Given this evidence, a stronger set of measures in relation to incarceration and 
policing seems to be the most obvious immediate policy choice available. Still, to the 
extent that income inequality is related to inequality in the provision of public goods and 
to lack of access to a wide range of basic services by a large fraction of the population, 
preventive social policies may also be effective. It is difficult to map this idea 
quantitatively on the empirical estimates of the effect of inequality on crime, but it seems 
reasonable to assume that, for example, better provision of basic health and education, 
leading in the medium-run to individuals with better opportunities in the legal market, 
could also lead to reductions in the incidence of crime. The combination of these two 
perspectives would suggest crime fighting strategies based on the two dimensions 
identified before: increased intensity and effectiveness of repressive policies, coupled 
with improvements in the socioeconomic environment and better access to public goods. 
As the next section illustrates, successful experiences of crime reduction in the region 
have adopted strategies along these lines. 
  The discussion in this section brings implicit the idea that the effectiveness of the 
penal system and of the police force in Latin America, when expanded, would be similar 
to that of the countries from which the estimates in Table 9 were generated. This is 
obviously not necessarily, and not likely, the case. In reality, the effectiveness of any 
given intervention will depend on the way it is conducted from an operational 
perspective, and on the institutional context in which it is implemented. In the next 
section, we discuss the strategy and institutional context of some successful experiences 
of crime reduction within Latin America. 
 
7. Success Experiences 
  In this section, we take a closer look at two specific experiences of successful 
crime reduction in Latin America. Local governments have played a key role in the recent 
past as agents of effective policy changes. In particular, the impressive achievements of   25
Bogotá, Colombia, became an example to many other cities in the region. São Paulo, the 




  Bogotá became a landmark for crime prevention in Latin America. Its policy 
strategy was inspired by the Development Security and Peace Program (DESPAZ), 
initially designed for the equally violent city of Cali. This program was launched in mid 
1994, when Rodrigo Guerrero was the mayor of Cali, aiming at both fighting and 
preventing violence through a public health approach. The program was abandoned after 
Guerrero left office in 1994, but by then it had already been incorporated into a broader 
public security plan for Bogotá, under the mayoral administration of Antanas Mockus.  
  In 1994, Bogotá had the highest homicide rate among capital cities in Latin 
America. Today, it has a homicide rate substantially lower than that of Caracas, Rio de 
Janeiro, and Washington DC, similar to that of Lima and Mexico City, and still above 
that of Buenos Aires, Miami, Panama City, and Santiago (Stanford Project on Urban 
Ecology and Violence, 2007).  
   The public health approach started with the development of a reliable information 
system aiming at monitoring the characteristics and demographics of cases of intentional 
and unintentional deaths or injuries, as well as of certain types of other crimes. This was 
achieved through the creation of an observatory of violence and crime. A package 
incorporating several different measures along various dimensions was then implemented 
(Concha-Eastman, 2005). This package included the following measures: limited hours 
for alcohol sales in bars, voluntary disarmament, improved police equipment targeted at 
faster response, and local projects to improve police performance and manage small 
conflicts. Local projects comprised conflict resolution initiatives, family police stations, 
and the Houses of Justice (Casas de Justicia), centers in popular neighborhoods where 
individuals could access the services of lawyers, social workers, psychologists, and in 
some cases judges. 
  The Colombian interventions were based on the idea of integrated municipal 
programs, combining public health, reclaiming of public space, and criminal justice   26
improvements. These were materialized on crime and violence information systems, 
improving access to justice, control of alcohol consumption and traffic accidents, 
assistance to vulnerable groups such as youth-at-risk, the ‘citizen culture’ program, and 
the recovery of public spaces such as parks and bicycle paths. In addition, there were 
efforts to strengthen the police force, as well as judicial reform. Much media attention 
was given to the “Ley Zanahoria,” imposing a 01:00 a.m. curfew on alcohol sales, and on 
the rush hour restrictions on private cars. 
  As a result, there was a significant reduction in crime rates in Bogotá, in reality 
much more extreme than initially anticipated. The homicide rate, which was around 80 
per 100,000 in 1993, declined to 21 in 2004. In Cali, significant reductions in crime were 
also observed when DESPAZ was implemented, but as the program was abandoned the 
change was reversed. In the case of Bogotá, on the other hand, the Peñalosa 
administration (starting in 1998) persisted pursuing the Mockus’s policies, incorporating 





th 2007, the city of São Paulo experienced 24 hours without a 
homicide. This was the first time the city went through an entire day without a single 
murder since the 1950s (Veja, 2007). This remarkable event was the culmination of years 
of consistent and successful policies in the fight against violent crime. 
Following the experience of Bogotá, several cities in the metropolitan area of São 
Paulo implemented different combinations of the measures included in the Colombian 
package. Policies included dry-laws, programs of voluntary disarmament, social 
programs, increases in incarceration rates, and changes in police organization and 
operation. Against the Brazilian national trend of increasing homicide rates, there was a 
continuous decline in homicide rates starting in 1999.  
  Though the particular role played by the different factors remains an open 
question, reorganization of the police force, stronger social support, and increased 
incarceration rates seem to have been important (see de Mello and Schneider, 2009). 
These included a change in attitude towards a more quantitative approach to crime   27
fighting and prevention, emphasizing empirical diagnosis of the pattern and distribution 
of crime, adoption of standardized procedures for police actions, and constant monitoring 
and evaluation of actions and use of resources. One of the first steps was the creation of 
InfoCrim, a system of criminal information designed to map criminal data in different 
police districts to enable a more organized and efficient use of resources. The change in 
policies also marked a shift to a more systematic involvement of the municipal and 
federal administrations on the fight against crime, as opposed to the more traditional 
model which relied mostly on the state government (Kahn, 2007). Some credit is also 
given to dry laws, which are estimated to have been responsible for a reduction in 
homicides of more than 10% (Biderman et al, 2009).   
  Diadema, a city in the metropolitan area of São Paulo, also achieved considerable 
success by coordinating the initiatives from various political and social actors and 
focusing on community cooperation within high-risk areas (World Bank, 2006). The 
municipality implemented monthly town meetings between the mayor, the city council, 
military and civil police chiefs, business, and religious and community leaders. At the 
same time, knowledge on violence reduction approaches and contacts with experts were 
established. As in the city of São Paulo itself, policies also included dry-laws, modern 
information systems to monitor the evolution of crime through time and space, and, in 
addition, creation of a task force to work with parents, students and teachers on violence 
prevention, particularly targeting school violence. The number of homicides in the case 
of Diadema was reduced by roughly 70% between 1999 and 2005 (data from the 
Secretary of Public Safety of the state of São Paulo). In the city of São Paulo itself, the 
number of intentional homicides was reduced by 79%. In the entire state, intentional 
homicides fell from 36 to 11, a 69% reduction. In contrast, the most recent numbers for 
Rio de Janeiro and Brazil as a whole indicate homicide rates of, respectively, 39 and 22 
per 100,000. 
  Still, as de Mello and Schneider (2009) highlight, the specific timing and 
coverage of the various interventions do not seem to be able to account for the 
chronology and magnitude of the reduction in homicide rates. Though evidence clearly 
indicates that several of these policies were indeed effective in reducing crime, they seem 
to have benefited from a particularly susceptible social environment. As the authors   28
argue, changes in the age distribution of the São Paulo population seem to have provided 
the fertile ground on which the policy interventions thrived. Precisely in the end of the 
1990s, and reflecting a particular stage of the demographic transition, the fraction of the 
population composed of young people started a consistent decline. The interaction of the 
demographic change with the wide host of policies adopted seems to provide a reasonable 
explanation for the remarkable performance of the homicide rates in the state of São 
Paulo. 
  If São Paulo’s government achieves its goal of 10 homicides (both intentional and 
non-intentional) per 100,000 inhabitants, the state will reach what the World Health 
Organization recognizes as an acceptable level of mortality due to homicides.  
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
  This paper argues that the high crime rates observed in Latin America seem to be 
consistent with the socioeconomic characteristics of its countries and with the policies 
implemented by governments in the region. There seems to be no basis for the claim that 
the patterns observed are due to unusual and exceptional characteristics faced by its 
countries. On the contrary, three factors widely recognized as being major determinants 
of the incidence of crime – inequality, police presence, and incarceration rates – account 
for most of the seemingly exceptionally high crime rates. This interpretation is further 
supported by successful experiences of crime reduction in some areas that would rank 
among the most violent in the region just a few decades ago. Among others, Bogotá and 
São Paulo have sustained steady declines in crime rates, particularly homicide, following 
the consistent and continued implementation of policies combining the use of more 
intense and effective repressive measures with social support programs.  
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Violence (per 
100,000)
Exp. Years of Life 
Lost




Latin Am. & Carib. 21.8 0.6 71.4 7,708          6.6                     
North America 6.5 0.2 76.1 25,672        11.6                   
Western Europe 4.0 0.1 76.2 19,532        8.7                     
Form. Communist 17.2 0.4 68.9 6,009          8.9                     
Western Pacific  7.8 0.2 76.0 17,839        9.4                     
Table 1: Homicide Rates and Development Variables, World Regions, Average for the 1990s
Notes: Regional numbers are unweighted country averages. The only African country included in the WHO cause specific mortality data is
Mauritius, and the only Eastern Mediterranean country is Kuwait. Therefore, these regions are not included in this table. Mortality due to violence
and life expectancy calculated based on data from the WHO, income per capita from the PWT 6.1, and average schooling from the Barro and Lee
dataset. Mortality due to violence is homicide and injury purposely inflicted by other persons plus other violent deaths, from the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD). Latin America US
Mortality due to Violence  
(per 100,000)
 21.8 10.2
GDP per capita 7,708 28,517









private expenditures       on 
prevention
1.40 0.60
opportunity cost of 
incarceration
0.10 0.60
monetary costs    (medical, 
etc.)
0.60 0.20
reduced growth 0.11 0.04
Total 5.79 4.09
Notes: Homicide and life expectancy data from the WHO, income per capita from the PWT 6.1. Social cost from
mortality due to violence calculated in Soares (2006). Costs from expenditures on public security, justice system,
and private prevention for Latin America from Lodono and Guerrero (1999). For the US, numbers on public security
and justice sytem from Levitt (1997). Remaining numbers on private expenditures, opportunity and monetary costs
from Bourguignon (1999). Impact on growth based on IV estimates of the effect of adult mortality on growth
presented in Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg (2006, Table 10, column 1), using mortality due to violence from
the WHO and population fractions from the WDI (estimate presented as the yearly cost in terms of current GDP
corresponding to the loss in growth induced by the higher mortality due to violence).
Social Cost of Crime and 
Violence               
(yearly cost as % GDP)
Table 2: Social Cost of Violence, Latin America and US, 1990sTheft Burglary Contact Theft Burglary Contact
Mean 2.07 0.67 0.25 25.08 6.68 7.65
Std Dev 2.23 0.72 0.31 6.84 3.74 3.68
Max 7.73 2.74 1.64 41.80 17.40 21.00
Min 0.01 0.01 0.00 11.60 0.80 2.00
Table 3: Official and Victimization Crime Statistics, Cross-section of Countries, 1990s
Official Data Victim Survey Data
Notes: Data is number of crimes as a percentage of population. Official data is taken from the UNCS data set and
victim survey data from the ICVS. For comparability between the two data sets, statistics for the official data are
calculated from country averages, from 1989 to the last year available. ICVS data are averages for all the surveys




ln(report burgl) 0.72 1
(0.00)
ln(report cont) 0.72 0.62 1
(0.00) (0.00)
ln(police) 0.30 0.18 0.25 1
(0.08) (0.34) (0.13)
time democ stability 0.64 0.58 0.61 0.12 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.50)
urban 0.67 0.52 0.53 0.24 0.49 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00)
education 0.61 0.49 0.39 0.18 0.37 0.67 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.29) (0.02) (0.00)
corruption -0.61 -0.68 -0.63 -0.11 -0.70 -0.52 -0.65
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.52) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Table 4: Correlation between Reporting Rate and Development, Cross-section of Countries, 1990s
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. Variables are natural logs of reporting rates for, respectively, thefts, burglaries, and contact crimes, natural log of
number of policemen as % of population, time of democratic stability, % of population living in urban areas, average schooling in the population aged 15 and














(0.0059) (0.0076) (0.0135) (0.0129) (0.0070) (0.0094)
urban -0.0083
  0.0044 0.0048 -0.0085 0.0062 0.0222
 
(0.0114) (0.0124) (0.0252) (0.0194) (0.0130) (0.0137)
education 0.0204
  -0.0535 0.0762 -0.2071 0.0109 -0.0796
 







** -0.5721 -2.6520 3.6299 -4.9126
* -3.7837
*
(0.9647) (1.6521) (2.0824) (2.7438) (0.7616) (1.2783)
F 26.25 20.85 4.45 8.64 6.99 6.09
N Obs 33.00 33.00 30.00 30.00 35.00 35.00
Obs.: Standard errors in parenthesis. * indicates significance at 5%; ** indicates significance at 10%. Robust
regression with iteratively reweighted least squares used to deal with outliers. Dependent variables are
natural logarithms of reporting rates for, respectively, thefts, burglaries, and contact crimes. Independent
variables are natural log of number of policemen as % of population, time of democratic stability, % of
population living in urban areas, average schooling in the population aged 15 and above, and ICRG
corruption index. Source: Table 4 from Soares (2004b).
Table 5: Reporting Rate Regressions - Cross-section of Countries, 1990s
ln(report theft) ln(report burgl) ln(report cont)Region Burglary Thefts Contact 
Crimes
Any Crime
Latin America 11.8 16.9 15.0 43.6
Africa 12.9 16.6 11.4 39.6
Asia 3.6 11.1 4.3 18.9
Former Communist 6.8 12.9 7.0 31.7
North America 8.0 10.1 8.7 34.0
Oceania 8.4 9.4 8.3 33.4
Western Europe 4.2 9.5 5.8 28.1
Table 6: Crime Rates (%) from Victimization Surveys (ICVS), World Regions, Average for the 1990s
Notes: Regional numbers are unweighted country averages. Source is ICVS (1989,
1992 and 1996/7). Burglaries include attempted burglaries. Thefts are bicycle or
motorcycle and other personal thefts, including pick pocketing. Contact crimes are
robberies, sexual incidents and/or threats/assaults. Any crime includes all previous
categories plus theft of car/joyriding, theft from car, and car vandalism. Numbers
based on major cities from each respective country.Country Burglary Thefts Contact 
Crimes
Any Crime
ALBANIA 6.0 15.9 5.6 27.1
ARGENTINA 10.5 20.2 14.5 50.7
AUSTRALIA 7.8 8.1 8.0 30.7
AUSTRIA 1.1 12.3 5.8 27.0
BELARUS 2.9 8.8 6.2 21.1
BELGIUM 5.2 4.8 4.7 22.5
BOLIVIA 13.8 19.2 12.0 40.1
BRAZIL 4.6 11.8 20.5 41.0
BULGARIA 10.8 12.3 8.3 38.4
CANADA 7.5 10.6 7.7 33.0
CHINA 2.5 15.9 4.9 21.6
COLOMBIA 14.1 19.9 21.0 53.7
COSTA RICA 14.3 14.3 11.3 39.7
CROATIA 2.3 6.1 5.4 20.2
CZECH REP. 6.8 17.3 6.2 37.5
EGYPT 6.9 9.6 8.3 27.0
ENGL & WALES 6.8 7.8 6.4 31.1
ESTONIA 11.8 13.6 11.2 39.7
FINLAND 0.9 10.3 7.6 25.1
FRANCE 6.1 11.1 4.7 28.1
FYR MACEDONIA 3.5 8.1 3.6 21.6
GEORGIA 8.2 10.3 8.5 33.4
GERMANY (W) 3.3 9.4 6.7 29.3
HUNGARY 4.1 8.3 2.4 24.7
INDIA 3.2 11.1 4.5 19.7
INDONESIA 5.4 8.2 3.7 17.2
ITALY 5.5 10.4 4.6 31.4
KYRGYZSTAN 6.8 12.5 7.5 27.4
LATVIA 8.8 15.0 5.9 33.4
LITHUANIA 9.0 11.2 5.7 33.1
MALTA 0.8 4.0 3.4 23.3
MONGOLIA 13.7 23.4 9.3 43.1
Table 7: Crime Rates (%) from Victimization Surveys (ICVS), Countries, Average for the 1990sNETHERLANDS 7.8 18.6 8.6 38.4
NEW ZEALAND 9.0 10.7 8.5 36.0
NORTH IRELAND 4.1 5.7 6.3 24.4
NORWAY 4.9 6.6 6.8 26.1
PARAGUAY 13.4 16.0 10.9 36.3
PHILIPPINES 3.3 9.0 4.0 16.9
POLAND 5.3 13.4 7.6 33.1
RUMANIA 3.1 13.4 7.9 29.4
RUSSIA 6.1 14.1 9.6 35.0
SCOTLAND 5.0 6.1 5.4 28.3
SLOVAKIA 8.4 15.1 4.0 35.9
SLOVENIA 5.3 8.9 6.5 30.3
SOUTH AFRICA 9.5 10.0 13.8 35.7
SPAIN 5.3 7.1 7.2 31.9
SWEDEN 4.1 16.9 6.5 30.6
SWITZERLAND 2.7 11.2 2.0 23.6
TANZANIA 12.1 18.0 6.8 37.6
TUNISIA 10.1 16.5 9.4 35.9
UGANDA 21.5 21.7 13.2 53.9
UKRAINE 7.8 21.6 9.2 38.2
USA 8.4 9.5 9.6 35.0
YUGOSLAVIA (F.R.) 5.4 8.9 8.5 32.3
ZIMBABWE 17.4 23.8 16.9 47.5
Note: Source is ICVS (1989, 1992 and 1996/7). Burglaries include attempted
burglaries. Thefts are bicycle or motorcycle and other personal thefts, including
pickpocketing. Contact crimes are robberies, sexual incidents and/or
threats/assaults. Any crime includes all previous categories plus theft of car/joyriding,
theft from car, and car vandalism. Numbers based on major cities from each








Rule of Law Police        
(per 100,000)




2000 1980-2000 2000 1980 2000 2000 2000 2000 2001
Argentina 5.83 0.2% 52.3 24.1 26% 0.1 558 4.7 109
Brazil 26.08 0.6% 61.2 30.7 28% -0.2 286 9.3 133
Chile 5.15 2.9% 56.9 22.8 24% 1.2 195 3.6 225
Colombia 70.21 1.1% 57.4 31.0 27% -0.7 216 9.4 126
Costa Rica 6.13 0.1% 50.1 31.2 27% 0.7 39 15.3 157
Mexico 10.96 0.6% 55.6 13.5 30% -0.5 451 . 164
Venezuela 26.20 -1.0% 45.8 20.7 27% -0.9 15 2.6 59
Avg for Selected Latin 
American Countries 21.5 0.7% 54.2 24.9 27% -0.04 252 7.5 139
Japan 0.6 2.4% 31.9 34.0 20% 1.7 182 2.4 51
Korea 1.7 5.8% 36.9 15.9 26% 0.5 192 3.4 133
Russia 28.1 -1.2% 42.5 15.2 23% -1.0 1222 46.7 638
Spain 1.0 2.4% 31.5 11.6 23% 1.3 286 8.4 117
Sweden 1.0 1.5% 29.2 15.9 18% 1.9 181 19.2 68
United States 5.9 2.3% 39.4 32.9 20% 1.8 325 11.0 685
Avg for Comparison Group 6.4 2.2% 35.2 20.9 22% 1.0 398 15.2 282
Table 8: Mortality due to Violence and Candidate Determinants of Crime, Slected Latin American and Comparison Countries
Notes: Growth rate from Penn World Tables 6.1 (real gross domestic income adjusted for terms of trade - rgdptt; the number for Russia is from the World Development Indicators gdp p.c. in 1995 US$). Gini index from
WIDER-UN, birth rate from the World Development Indicators, population between 15-29 from the World Health Organization, rule of law index (range: -2.5; +2.5) from the Government Matters V dataset (World Bank).
Police rate is total police personnel in 2000 from the United Nations Survey on Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice (1998 for Argentina, 2001 for Mexico, Venezuela and US, 1994 for Russia; for Brazil, data
from the Ministry of Justice for 2003). Judges refer to magistrates and judges (number of professional judges and magistrates in 2000 from the United Nations Survey on Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice;
1997 for Argentina, 2001 for US; for Brazil, 2005 data from Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil - OAB). Incarceration rate is the official records of total prison population from the International Centre of Prison Studies
(2002 for Costa Rica and 2000 for Venezuela).Variable Study Data Response of Crime to 
Explanatory Variable
Partial Cumulative Partial Cumulative
incarceration rate Levitt (1996) US -0.379% per 1% change 13.1 13.1 17.3 17.3
police Levitt (2002) US -0.435% per 1% change 16.1 9.8 22.2 17.8
fraction of young population Levitt (1999) US 0.41% per 1% change 19.8 9.0 19.7 16.3
inequality (gini) Fajnzylber, Lederman, 
and Loayza (2002b)
Cross-country 1.5% per unit change 15.4 6.4 14.9 11.3
growth (income p.c.) Fajnzylber, Lederman, 
and Loayza (2002b)
Cross-country -2.4% per percentage 
point change
20.7 6.3 20.4 10.7
Table 9: Estimates of the Effects of Explanatory Variables on Homicides and Differential in Crime Explained by Each Variable
Mortality to Violence      
in LA if avg were set to:   
avg of Comparison       
[viol.: 21.5 against 6.4]
Mortality to Violence      
in LA if avg were set to:    
avg of Comp. w.o. Russia  
[viol.: 21.5 against 2.1]
Notes: For Levitt (1996 and 2002), the estimates are elasticities for violent crime. For Levitt (1999), the crime variable is homicide rate and we calculate the average elasticity from the















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2 (a): Mortality due to Violence by Age Group, Selected Latin American 
Countries, 1990s
Argentina Brazil Colombia Mexico













































































Figure 3 (a): Income per Capita and Reporting Rate of Thefts, Cross-section of 
Coutnries, 1990s













































Figure 3 (b): Income per Capita and Reporting Rate of Burglaries, Cross-section of 
Coutnries, 1990s
ln(income per capita)

















































Figure 3 (c): Income per Capita and Reporting Rate of Contact 






















































































Figure 4 (b): Homicide Rate, Selected Latin American Countries
ARGENTINA CHILE COSTA RICA MEXICO





















































































Figure 5 (b): Homicide Rate btwn 15 and 24, Selected Latin American Countries
ARGENTINA CHILE COSTA RICA MEXICO
Source: WHO, PAHO and DATASUS.